Differential Submarine ASW Combat Tactics

[Molon Labe]

Overview

Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards... Water shapes its course according to the nature of the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in relation to the foe whom he is facing. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant conditions. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. --Sun Tzu

This thread is about 1v1 combat between submarines of different classes. It assumes you are already familiar with the material discussed in Basic ASW Tactics. The first part will review the vital specifications of the playable submarines in DW. The second part will analyze the relative strengths and weaknesses of the submarines in each phase of the battle. The final section discusses methods for using those differences to gain an advantage against an opponent.

I do not claim that the tactics discussed herein are necessarily the best against all persons or in all situations. Unique circumstances requiring different tactics can arise at any time, and superior tactics will inevitably evolve as players think up better ways to stay ahead. (Also, I have to admit my experience with stock DW is far more limited than it is with LWAMI, so my analysis of the stock matchups might be a off in close areas.) The most important thing to take away from this post isn’t “knowing to do X and not Y.” Instead, learn to identify where you are comparatively strong or weak and use that knowledge to force your opponent to fight on terms favorable to you.

Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.--Sun Tzu

[Molon Labe]

Submarine Specifications

Note: If specifications are changed by LWAMI (3.08) then stock values are given first, then LWAMI. An asterisk (*) denotes that the given values are estimated or calculated based upon other data but has not been tested individually. Washout values are for the lowest speed that causes any washout; the sensor will still be able to hear for a few knots above that speed.

If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.--Sun Tzu


SSN-21 Seawolf
Base SL: 63/55
Tactical Speed SL: 66.75/62.11

Sonars:
TB-29:
Sensitivity: -14/-12
Washout: 16kts
TB-16:
Sensitivity: -10/-8
Washout: 19kts
Sphere:
Sensitivity: -15/-20
Washout: 19kts
Hull:
Sensitivity: -5/-6
Washout: 10kts

Maximum Speed: 40 knots/38 knots
Maximum Depth: 600m

Countermeasure tubes:
2 Internal (25 Realoads. Reload time: 3 minutes, Change load time 5.5 minutes)
16 External (No reloads)

Torpedo Tubes: 8 (42 reloads. Reload time: 8 minutes, Change load time: 16 minutes)

ASW Armament:
Mk 48 ADCAP wireguided torpedo
Speed: 55kts, Range @ max speed: 21nm, Max Depth: 833m

SSN-688(I) Improved Los Angeles
Base SL: 65/58
Tactical Speed SL:
TB-23: XX/62.85
TB-16: 70.4/65.27

Sonars:
TB-23:
Sensitivity: -10
Washout: 15kts
TB-16:
Sensitivity: -10/-8
Washout: 19kts
Sphere:
Sensitivity: -12/-18
Washout: 19kts
Hull:
Sensitivity: -5/-5
Washout: 10kts

Maximum Speed: 35 knots/33 knots
Maximum Depth: 450m

Countermeasure tubes:
2 Internal (25 Realoads. Reload time: 3 minutes,* Change load time 5.5 minutes*)

Torpedo Tubes: 4 (22 reloads. Reload time: 8 minutes*, Change load time: 16 minutes*)

ASW Armament:
Mk 48 ADCAP wireguided torpedo
Speed: 55kts, Range @ max speed: 21nm, Max Depth: 833m


Akula-I (Improved) and Akula-II
Base SL:
Akula-I (imp): 65/59
Vepr: 64/57
Akula-II: 65/57

Tactical Speed SL:
Akula-I (imp): 67.12
Vepr: 66.12/61.20
Gepard: 67.12/63.00
Akula-II: xxx/63.00

Sonars:
Pelamida II (LWAMI: All Akula II except Vepr)
Sensitivity: -10
Washout: 11kts
Pelamida (stock: all Akulas, LWAMI: Akula-I and Vepr):
Sensitivity: -10/-8
Washout: 8kts
Cylindrical:
Sensitivity: -12/-16
Washout: 13kts
Conformal:
Sensitivity: -5/-4
Washout: 7kts

Maximum Speed:
Akula-I(imp) 33 knots/35 knots
Akula-II: 35 knots

Maximum Depth: 520m

Countermeasure tubes:
2 Internal (25 Realoads. Reload time: 3 minutes*, Change load time 5.5 minutes*)

Torpedo Tubes:
4 650mm Internal
4 533mm Internal
(42 reloads. Reload time: 8 minutes*, Change load time: 16 minutes*)
6 533mm External
(No reloads, no wire guidance)

ASW Armament (stock)
65 cm wireguided torpedo
Speed: 50kts, Range @max speed: 21nm, Max Depth: 1000m

53 cm wireguided torpedo
Speed: 40kts, Range @max speed: 7.4nm*, Max Depth: 500m

SS-N-16 Stallion SUBROC
Range: 40nm; UGMT-1 Torpedo: Speed: 41kts, Range: 3.2nm*, Max Depth: 547m

SS-N-27 ASW SUBROC
Range: 16.8nm; Type 40 Torpedo: Speed: 68-72kts, Range: <5.2nm*, Max Depth: 656m

Shkval supercavitating torpedo
Speed: 200kts, Range: 6.2nm, Max Depth: 398m

ASW Armament (LWAMI):

UGST wireguided torpedo
Speed: 50kts, Range @ max speed: 21nm, Max Depth: 804m

SS-N-16 Stallion SUBROC
Range: 53nm, APR-3 Torpedo: Speed: 68kts, Range: ~1.5nm, Max Depth: 800m, No re-attack capability.

SS-N-27 ASW SUBROC
Range: 26nm, MPT-1UE Torpedo: Speed: 45kts, Range: ~5nm*, Max Depth: 656m

Shkval supercavitating torpedo
Speed: 200kts, Range: 6.2nm, Max Depth: 398m

Kilo and Kilo (Improved) SSK
Base SL:
Kilo: 60
Kilo (I): 55
Tactical Speed SL:
Kilo: 61.76/61.29
Kilo (I): 56.5/56.30

Sonars:
NO TOWED ARRAY
Cylindrical:
Sensitivity: -12/-13
Washout: 13kts
Conformal:
Sensitivity: -5/-3
Washout: 7kts

Maximum Speed:
Kilo: 17kts
Kilo (I): 20kts

Maximum Depth: 300m

Countermeasure tubes:
2 Internal (25 Reloads. Reload time: 1 minute, Change load time 1.5 minutes)

Torpedo Tubes:
4 533mm Internal (no wire guidance)
(8 reloads)
2 533mm Internal (wire guidance capable)
(2 reloads each)
Reload time: 2 minutes
Change load time: 4 minutes

ASW Armament (Russian Kilos)

USET-80 torpedo: Speed 50kts, Range @ max speed: 8nm, depth: 547m

TEST-71M wireguided torpedo: Speed: 40kts, Range @ max speed: 8.2nm, depth: 437m

SS-N-15 Starfish SUBROC:
Range: 16.8nm/18nm, UGMT-1 Torpedo: Speed: 41kts, Range: 3.2nm*, depth: 547m

ASW Armament (Chinese Kilos)

SET-53ME Torpedo(stock): Speed 29kts, Range @ max speed: 5.5nm, depth 400m

Yu-8 Torpedo (LWAMI): Speed: 45kts, Range @ max speed: 7.2nm, depth: 475m

TEST-71ME (-NK) Same as TEST-71M above

91RE1 ASW (SS-N-27) SUBROC
Range: 16.8nm/26nm, Type 40 Torpedo (stock): Speed: 68-72kts, Range: <5.2nm*, Max Depth: 656m, MPT-1UE Torpedo (LWAMI): Speed: 45kts, Range: ~5nm*, Max Depth: 656m

[Molon Labe]

Analysis of Differential Performance

The general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.--Sun Tzu

Detection Phase
You (hopefully) remember from Basic ASW tactics that the submarine that makes first detection starts out with a significant lead. In differential submarine combat, the opposing submarines will have different base Source Levels, different patrol speed Source Levels, and different sonar sensitivities. These factors together determine which sub will likely be the first to get a detection. This section compares the performance of the different submarines and discusses how you should best apply that to make the transition to the tracking phase in the best possible position.

Stock DW Matchup
In stock DW, the Kilos are easily the quietest subs, at any speed. In fact, a stock non-improved Kilo at flank is only as “noisy” as a Seawolf at rest. This makes them very hard to detect by passive means. The Seawolf is the next quietest, followed by the Vepr, and the rest of the Akulas and the 688I are tied. All SSNs gain 10 points to their SLs going from rest to flank, which means that the slower subs increase their SL more quickly as speed increases, but only by a very slow amount.

The Seawolf has the most sensitive towed array, while the TAs of the 688I and Akulas are tied. The Kilo, without a TA, is nearly blind for ASW purposes, and even when she can detect a sub, she cannot tell a US sub from a RU sub from a fishing boat very well.

Overall, the only boat that has a decisive advantage over the others is the Seawolf, an advantage that is easy to hold onto with even the slightest amount of speed discipline. The 688Is and Akulas are evenly matched. Kilos and SSNs will have a very hard time finding each other in the first place, although the SSN can often make use of active sonar without much fear of surrendering the initiative because the SSN will likely be out of range and can disappear before the Kilo can get in range and establish passive contact.


LWAMI Matchup
At rest, LWAMI subs rank, from quietest to loudest, in this order: (1) Seawolf and Kilo(I), (3) Akula-II, (4) 688(I), (5)Akula-I(I), (6) Kilo. The sound-speed relationship is much more sensitive than in stock DW. Every playable sub in LWAMI has its own unique sound-speed curve. The Kilos increase their SL with speed at the highest pace, followed by the Akulas, followed by the 688I, and the Seawolf has the honor of staying the quietest at speed.

On the sensor front, the only significant change is the inclusion of the TB-23 on the 688(I). All Akula-IIs, except the Vepr, also have the Pelamida-II towed array, but this differs from the Pelamida only in washout speed.

Because they are both quieter and have more sensitive sonars, the US SSNs have a substantial detection range advantage over their Russian counterparts. This advantage does require significant speed discipline to maintain, however, especially if the US SSN is a 688(I) or if the Russian SSN is an Akula-II. US SSNs also maintain a nearly absolute detection range advantage against the Kilos; the Kilo only has a chance of outperforming a US SSN if there is a very large speed difference between the two boats.

Tracking Phase

Stock DW Matchup
Mutual detections are very common in stock DW because the subs’ base SLs, sound-speed curves, and sonar performance are all very close. Thus, in most cases, submarines enter the tracking phase on close to even footing. But, this is where the US SSNs have their chance to pull ahead. The Pelamida has a tactical speed of 7 knots, compared to 18 knots for the TB-16 and 15 knots for the TB-29. The higher the speed difference between the subs, the easier it is for the faster sub to plot a solution on the slower sub. Of course, if aTMA is on, then plotting a solution is easy for “Otto” no matter what, so not much will change.

The Seawolf’s Rapid Localization ability will provide a “good enough to shoot” solution on a target within 15nm.

LWAMI Matchup
US SSNs will typically come into the tracking phase well ahead of their Russian counterparts, and should be seeking to maintain that advantage. With proper speed discipline, a US sub can close to within lethal range of an Akula without being counterdetected. If a US sub is counterdetected, it has the same advantages as the US subs do in stock DW, except that the Akula-IIs (except Vepr) have a tactical speed of 10 knots instead of 7.

Because US SSNs have a substantial detection range advantage against Russian SSNs, US subs are significantly more likely to obtain DEMON information against an Akula, or even a Kilo, than vice versa. US subs have a slight advantage in their sphere/cylindrical and hull/conformal sensitivity, so provided the opponents are at the same speed (and thus the US sub is probably quieter), US subs are slightly more likely than the Russian SSNs to obtain a Master contact. This relationship can be turned on its head, however, if the US SSN is at tactical speed.

The Seawolf has the same RapLoc ability that it has in stock DW.

Engagement Phase

Stock DW Matchup
Submarines with SUBROC capability have a tremendous advantage in this phase. These weapons get out to the target much more quickly than a conventional torpedo. A player under SUBROC attack can expect to have to dodge two salvoes minimum before he/she is able to get conventional torpedoes on target. Each successive attack will be more accurate than the last, because “weapon truth” will reveal the courses of the torpedoes and point to the target sub’s location. Like all other torpedoes in Stock DW, they have an acquisition range of about 2nm. Thus, two weapons spaced 4nm apart could cover 8nm of range uncertainty down a line of bearing. The SS-N-27 is particularly brutal because its torpedo moves at the blistering speed of 68+ knots.

The probability of a kill varies greatly depending on the accuracy that the SUBROC was fired with (which in many cases will mean whether aTMA is on), the direction of approach, the number of acquired weapons approaching from different directions, the number of decoys the target can put in the water, and whether the .ini settings allow detonations on decoys (which can go either way depending on how many weapons vs. decoys there are in the water). In an aTMA match, a 688(I) (2 decoy launchers) is nearly helpless against a well-executed SUBROC attack, while the Kilo and Seawolf have a chance of survival as long as they can get decoys between them and the weapons. Odds of survival increase across the board if aTMA is disabled.

If detonations are enabled in the ini, the situation overall tends to favor the SUBROC-equipped sub to a greater degree. The Seawolf gets the most immediate benefit from having detonations enabled in the .ini, because torpedoes that would otherwise be re-attacking are destroyed, and there are still decoys ready to go to spoof the next torpedo that acquires. However, a 688(I) or even a Kilo would soon find itself with empty decoy tubes while a torpedo is closing. Enabling detonations also causes conventional torpedoes to detonate, and it takes much longer for a 2nd torpedo volley to arrive on-target than a SUBROC. The 688(I) in particular suffers if detonations are enabled because of its small salvo size, which makes it more likely that an entire salvo will be detonated by decoys before one kills the target.

When SUBROCs are not being used, US subs enjoy a substantial advantage in wielding wireguided torpedoes. This is because the US subs have equal or greater speed than their Russian counterparts, higher tactical speeds, and faster torpedoes. This means the US sub can fire its torpedo from further away than a Russian, or if fired from the same range, the US torpedo will arrive first. The US sub can maintain its solution on the enemy sub much better than the Russian sub can.

In a close in knife-fight situation, the Akula gains an advantage because of the Shkval torpedo, especially in shallow water or narrow channels, where there is less space for the target sub to escape the proximity warhead. Although difficult to use effectively, the Shkval is capable of getting out to target very quickly—sometimes before the target can respond, and in nearly all cases, before the target can get a conventional torpedo within range to threaten the Akula. A Shkval hit is often not lethal to the target sub, but will nearly always damage at least one critical system, for example: sonar, torpedo tubes, or countermeasure tubes. A sub wounded by a Shkval will thus likely be unable to fire weapons, guide weapons, and/or evade a follow-up shot.

All SSNs have a significant advantage against Kilos in a torpedo-slinging duel, because SSN torpedoes are (mostly) higher speed and longer ranged. The only wireguided torpedo the Kilo has is the TEST-71, which underperforms wireguided torpedoes from other SSNs in all categories. The Kilo is much slower than an SSN and will have a very hard time tracking an SSN in combat. If detonations are enabled in the .ini, however, the Kilo becomes much more survivable because of the short decoy reload times.

LWAMI Matchup
Unlike stock DW, there is more than one torpedo seeker in LWAMI. The torpedoes dropped by SUBROCs have an estimated acquisition range of 1nm (.75nm for the UGMT-1), significantly increasing the degree of accuracy needed to use SUBROCs effectively. The hypersonic Type 40 has been removed from the SS-N-27 in favor of the less beastly (but still quite deadly) MPT-1UE. The Stallion’s new torpedo is nearly as fast as the old Type 40, but, it requires a 650mm tube to use, and the weapon’s slow speed during the search phase makes the Stallion the most difficult SUBROC to get an acquisition with. The APR-3 is also incapable of re-attack should it acquire a decoy or lose its lock on the target sub. Missile shots produce an audible TIW alert and a very visible BB signal, so the target sub will always be alerted to the fact that the missile has been fired (unless the target sub was under the layer and distant, or had washed out its sonar) and can commence evasion early.

The UGST has an estimated acquisition range of 1.375nm, compared to the ADCAP’s 1.5nm. The USET-80 acquires at about 1nm, the Yu-8 at about .875nm, and the TEST-71 around .75nm Speed and range specifications are unchanged.

The Seawolf and 688I are both slower than they are in stock DW by 2 knots, and the Akula-I is 2 knots faster. These differences are not enough to overcome the Russians’ disadvantage in no-escape range, and in light of the tactical speed difference, does not come close overcome their disadvantage in torpedo-dueling overall. The Akula-II’s (other than Vepr) are only at a slight overall torpedo-dueling disadvantage in this area, thanks to the Pelamida II.
The matchup in all other aspects of this phase is the same as in stock DW.

[Molon Labe]

Differential Combat Tactics

Seawolf/688(I) v. Akula

If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we have still gone only halfway towards victory.--Sun Tzu

A US SSN facing an Akula should at all times be concerned about entering both the SS-N-27 weapons envelope AND the Shkval envelope. The US sub should take note of any ice coverage which would block a SUBROC, or any shallows where the torpedo would end up on the bottom (Stock: ~300ft IIRC) and travel near or in those areas. The US sub should plot a patrol course that avoids obstacles, choke points, and blind corners, attempting to capitalize on its detection range advantage against the Akula.

Once that detection is obtained, the US SSN must plot an accurate solution and close—stealthily—to within ADCAP range. As a practical matter, the no-escape range of 8.64 (Stock Akula I) to 7.85nm is a useful benchmark for determining what that range should be—your actual results will vary based upon target response time, target evasion course, and how well you keep your torpedoes on course, and how much runtime your torpedoes waste snaking without acquiring. Closing this distance will not be easy, especially in stock DW. Clearly, poor acoustic conditions will help the US SSN close range undetected. Going below the layer in a surface duct SSP is also helpful, especially during periods of higher speed (although the US SSN must keep in mind that the Akula drop its TA below the layer while it is above, so this works best when the Akula is below the layer.). Sprints should always be done from behind an obstacle. Advancing at tactical speed is advisable above the layer when the Akula is below, since the US SSN will always detect the Akula when it comes back up in time for the US SSN to slow down, or dive beneath the layer, before the Akula’s TA is back above. However, if playing stock DW, the possibility of the Akula having left a UUV above the layer cannot be discounted.

If the US sub is counterdetected, it must accelerate and begin jinking immediately. Care must be exercised not to accelerate too much and giving the Akula a Master contact. This is a greater danger with LWAMI because of the steeper sound-speed relationship. If aTMA is being used, then the Akula will likely obtain a solid solution quickly anyways, so a Master contact makes less of a difference. If a layer is present, the US sub should get below it upon detection of any missile launch, to (hopefully) reduce the effective acquisition of the torpedoes that will soon splash down. The US sub should also immediately clear datum.

Even if the US SSN did not reach its desired firing range, it must fire as soon as it has been counterdetected. While the Akula might be able to drag the torpedoes out of range, while it does this it is completely defensive and will not be updating its solution with any data other than that gathered by the weapons it shoots. It must slow down to fire missiles. Supression fire is better isn’t as good as a kill shot, but it’s better than giving the Akula impunity.

Upon the beginning of combat, the US SSN should begin withdrawing (exception: 100% ice coverage). The longer the fight goes on, the more the scales tip in favor of the Akula—you can’t dodge SUBROCs forever. If the US SSN has torpedoes that have a realistic chance of killing the target, it should keep the track updated to give them the best chance possible. But, if it was unable to get close enough to take a lethal shot, then it should be to extend and disengage.

Akula v. US SSN

The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the fact that we have made our position unassailable.--Sun Tzu

With the exception of a stock match between an Akula and a 688(I), the Akula will nearly always have to cede 1st detection to the US SSN. The exception will be in those cases where the US SSN fails to avoid blind corners, creating a situation where the Akula can lie in ambush in such an area and the US SSN and Akula detect each other simultaneously. The best possible ambush position would be near a narrow, shallow channel, where a Shkval salvo would be a nearly guaranteed kill shot. But any cover which causes the US sub to get within the Akula’s sonar range before there is a “line-of-sound” between the subs can be used to tip the balance decidedly in the Akula’s favor. In chosing such ground to fight on, however, the Akula should always leave itself an escape route. If the Akula backs itself against a wall, the US SSN will not have to close range as much to take a lethal shot, and therefore is less likely to allow itself to be detected.

Unless the environment is favorable or the opposing captain foolish, the Akula will likely have to concede first detection to the American. The Akula should therefore always try to be as unpredictable as possible to make tracking it difficult. It should also always have torpedoes and SUBROCs ready to be snapshotted immediately, probably Shkvals too.

In a surface duct SSP, an Akula should spend more time above the layer than below, increasing the range of its sensors relative to the ADCAP’s no-escape range. The Akula should frequently take advantage of its ability to remain above the layer while listening below. In stock DW, the Akula should make generous use of UUVs, as they can be more powerful than the Pelamida.

Upon detection of the US sub in open-sea conditions, the Akula should assume it has been counterdetected. It should turn away from the US sub, increasing the amount of time it has to obtain a solution before the US sub is in range to fire its torpedoes. Increasing speed and jinking may also be advantageous at this point to throw off the US sub’s solution and maybe cause him/her to make a mistake, however, it is probably better not to signal the counterdetection to the US sub. Time, in this situation, is mostly on the Akula’s side, especially if the US sub has not closed to near no-escape range. Once the Akula’s solution begins firming up, if it appears that the US sub is in range or almost in range, the Akula should fire torpedoes and SUBROCs immediately. If the solution suggests the Akula has time to spare, the Akula should take that time and use it to set up a SUBROC bracket shot or precision head shot.

If the first direct evidence of the presence of the US sub is a TIW, the Akula should immediately fire snapshot torpedoes and attempt with all haste to obtain a solution for the site of the launch. This process can be best accomplished by triangulation with a UUV, which even the less-sensitive LWAMI UUVs are useful for. Alternatively, the torpedo might be loud enough to get a Master contact on for a less-accurate triangulation. aTMA might also be quick enough to give a reasonably accurate solution on the torpedo (or even the sub if you’re lucky enough to tag it) in 2-6 minutes. One that solution is obtained, it should be SUBROC’ed with due haste, with an evasion course anticipated. If the solution suggests the weapon was fired from outside its no-escape range, then the Akula has the option of dragging the weapon, which will guarantee survival of this engagement (but will leave you in the same position you started in if the US sub re-engages). But, if contact on the US sub is achieved through any means—including data from weapons—or if the torpedoes might have been fired from inside no-escape range, then the Akula should press the attack. If torpedoes are acquiring the US sub, it will likely accelerate to flank and become detectable on the TA if it was not already. Between onboard sensors and torpedo acquisitions, the Akula should attempt to identify the location of the US sub and administer a coup-de-grace SUBROC shot—or, at the very least, keep the sub too busy evading MPT-1UE’s or Type 40s to maintain its solution the Akula and unable to drag away from the wireguided torpedoes, allowing the Akula’s wireguided torpedoes to find their mark before the ADCAPs).


SSN v. Kilo

The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete.--Sun Tzu

The Kilo is hobbled by short ranged weapons and a lousy sonar suite. It’s only hope against an SSN is to stay hidden unless and until the SSN blunders into the Kilo. The SSN can make sure that doesn’t happen. Just as the US sub can avoid ambush by keeping away from obstacles, channels, and blind corners, an SSN can avoid stumbling into a Kilo. With LWAMI, even the relatively noisy 688(I) maintains an absolute detection range advantage over a Kilo (I) even at tactical speed. In stock DW, the advantage is not so absolute; the situation may simply be that neither the Kilo nor SSN can find each other.


Submarine active sonar is capable of detecting another submarine at very long ranges, often in excess of 20nm. The use of active sonar against an SSN is generally inadvisable during the detection phase because the SSN will be able to use that information to gain a passive track before it would otherwise be able to, against a Kilo it carries very little risk. Active sonar can detect a Kilo at many times the range of the Kilos own sensors, and from beyond the range of its weapons. A Kilo cannot move quickly enough to close range with an SSN quickly enough to get within range to locate and engage an SSN. So, SSNs enjoy impunity with active sonar use against a Kilo.


The SSN need only close to 14.92-12.96nm to get within no-escape range. While that is inside the range of the SS-N-27 and SS-N-15, to guarantee its safety the SSN need only clear datum after the ping and close range from a different bearing. (EDIT 13 April 2008: See TLAM's post, post #8 infra, for why clearing datum is important.) The Kilo will likely be in about the same place, and with LWAMI, if it tries to sprint it will be very vulnerable to passive detection.


The torpedo shot itself (and perhaps a ping to verify range) can be dangerous because of the possibility of a “range-spread” fired down the line of bearing. But, as it would be fired from rather long range, the SSN has time to get off that line of bearing, and the Kilo only has 6 tubes with which to saturate the line of bearing and possible evasion courses.


An SSN that stumbles upon a Kilo should open range, and should fire once outside of the Kilos torpedo range. If the Kilo shoots a torpedo, the SSN should return fire, attempt for a quick triangulation (again, UUVs help) and, if the weapon was fired from outside no-escape range by a non-SUBROC carrying Kilo, it should drag. If fired from inside no-escape range or if the shooter might have SUBROCs, pure drag is inadvisable. If the SSN detects a missile launch, the SSN should snapshot back, get deep, and clear datum.

Kilo vs. SSN

The art of using troops is this: …
When five times his strength, attack him; …
If equally matched you may engage him;
If weaker numerically, be capable of withdrawing;
And if in all respects unequal, be capable of eluding him—for a small force is but booty for one more powerful.--Sun Tzu

The best tactical advice to give a Kilo if it must face an SSN is maintain stealth and avoid contact altogether. This is especially true outside of the littorals, in open seas with favorable acoustic conditions. Assuming avoidance isn’t an option, the Kilo should look for any obstacle that could hide it from active or passive sonar searches. If the Kilo has an idea of the direction of approach of the SSN, it should maintain bow or stern aspect on that direction. Kilos should spend more time under the layer (in a surface duct SSP) than they do above to maximize their stealth and to make it more likely that an SSN it detects will be in range. A stock DW Klub-capable Kilo(I) may be an exception, though, because it may be possible for that sub to detect an SSN more than 5nm away in the duct, in an envelope more suitable for SUBROC use than torpedoes.

If a detection is obtained, a non-SUBROC equipped ship should immediately slow and move to the most acoustically disfavorable part of the SSP, hoping the SSN will continue to close and enter torpedo range. A SUBROC equipped Kilo should fire more quickly, using SUBROCs to cut off the SSNs escape route from the conventional torpedoes. A SUBROC equipped Kilo in stock DW may be able to track the contact normally and place accurate SUBROC fire on it.

[Note: Edited 13 April 2008, edits in italics]If faced with active pings, a Kilo should react by going to bow or stern aspect to the source. This will reduce the range at which the SSN can get a return. Alternatively, the Kilo could turn 90 degrees to the source and accelerate. This will likely concede detection, but it may also allow for a quick triangulation of the SSNs position if the SSN pings twice from about the same location. (Hat tip: TLAM, post 7 infra) If the SSN is not moving much, the active intercept lines will converge at its location. If the SSN is not cooperative and is moving, but is pinging frequently, then this could allow for a near passive-quality track; in this case, and if aTMA is disabled, some angle-off will help produce a solution. If the Kilo has SUBROCs, it should use them as soon as there is some pK in doing so, although this must be balanced against concern for exhausting the loadout prematurely. Guesses as to range should be biased towards SUBROC maximum range, except against the SS-N-27 in LWAMI, which has a range long enough that the SSN can be expected to be operating inside it for a substantial portion of the engagement.

If fired upon from outside no-escape range, the Kilo should in drag the weapon, except in the rare case that the Kilo has a track on the opposing SSN. If a track exists, a SUBROC equipped Kilo should maintain that track and engage aggressively. Otherwise, the Kilo has nothing to gain by sticking around; the best the Kilo can hope for is to be able to break contact and force the SSN to begin the hunt all over again. If available, SUBROCs should be fired at the point of origin for the torpedo, adjusted for an estimate of the SSNs evasion course, but the pK of such attacks will be low, especially with LWAMI.

If the weapon was fired from inside no-escape range, then there aren’t any tactical choices to make—the Kilo must simply evade as good as it can and counterattack as good as it can and hope it can get a weapon on target before the SSN puts its torpedoes on the correct target. The Kilo’s fast decoy launchers will help it extend its life a little bit, but unless the Kilo can manage to kill the sub steering the torpedoes, the outcome is inevitable.



Related Topics:
The Akula as a Dueling Submarine in Multiplayer
The SS-N-27 ASW: Evening the Odds

[Phil21]

Great Work!
Thank you ML.

One Question, though it's quite offtopic: How is the Sensor sensitivity measured? In what "unit"? I see that the smaller/more negativ a figure is, the more effective is the sensor. But why has eg. the sphere of the Seawolf a 'better' value than its TA, although the TA is more effective?

Phil

[Molon Labe]

Not off-topic at all.

There aren't any units really, those are just straight-up database values. The higher magnitude, the higher the sensitivity. But, don't compare sensitivities between sonars in different frequency ranges, because lower frequencies travel much further.

[TLAM Strike]

One thing I would like to mention in regards to a Kilo vs. SSN fight is that when a Kilo detects a Yankee Search directed at it has the option of going for a ping steal- a maneuver covered in the Seawolf’s Blue Book. If you don’t have the Blue Book handy a Ping Steal is done by sprinting on a track 90 degrees off from the bearing of the ping so where the LOBs of a second ping cross gives the location of the pinging platform. Also as I mentioned in my Kilo Guide in the place of the second ping the LOB of a TIW call can be used to triangulate the location. Send a few SUBROCs to the location of the LOB cross.

[subb]

Originally Posted by TLAM Strike

One thing I would like to mention in regards to a Kilo vs. SSN fight is that when a Kilo detects a Yankee Search directed at it has the option of going for a ping steal- a maneuver covered in the Seawolf’s Blue Book. If you don’t have the Blue Book handy a Ping Steal is done by sprinting on a track 90 degrees off from the bearing of the ping so where the LOBs of a second ping cross gives the location of the pinging platform. Also as I mentioned in my Kilo Guide in the place of the second ping the LOB of a TIW call can be used to triangulate the location. Send a few SUBROCs to the location of the LOB cross.

oh yes, i remember this one well..

I wonder how wild fish riding by the kilo would fare in a situation like this..

[Molon Labe]

Originally Posted by TLAM

One thing I would like to mention in regards to a Kilo vs. SSN fight is that when a Kilo detects a Yankee Search directed at it has the option of going for a ping steal- a maneuver covered in the Seawolf’s Blue Book. If you don’t have the Blue Book handy a Ping Steal is done by sprinting on a track 90 degrees off from the bearing of the ping so where the LOBs of a second ping cross gives the location of the pinging platform. Also as I mentioned in my Kilo Guide in the place of the second ping the LOB of a TIW call can be used to triangulate the location. Send a few SUBROCs to the location of the LOB cross.

It can work, but it depends on the SSN's cooperation in pinging twice from about the same location. If the SSN driver makes this mistake, then yeah, he/she deserves to get pwn3d by a Kilo.

Originally Posted by subb

oh yes, i remember this one well..

I wonder how wild fish riding by the kilo would fare in a situation like this..

As I understand it, "wild fish riding" worked in a simulated world where the BB sonar was the primary means of contact, and thus a strong, wide, bright contact of a loud torpedo would drown out the barely visible soft trace of a submarine. The utility of such a tactic (or perhaps exploit), it seems to me, would be very limited in the a simulated world like DW's where the primary means of contact is the NB sonar, because even if the sonar profile matches, you can still see the weaker line squiggling behind the brighter line and immediately know that the sub is on the same bearing as the torpedo. The best you can hope for is that the sonar operator won't be able to assign a tracker to the sub. Or am I missing something?

[subb]

@molon

That’s pretty much how it works, but regarding NB contact and with some additional flexibility, and depending on what sub you are using / fighting. Come to think of it, it may not be the wise thing to do as a kilo since you run into compromising battery levels and possibly stealth using this tactic. This tactic consist of the following components:

Target: intimidation, confusion, play on emotions
Aggressor: aggression, stealth, master on contact, sudden strike capability (subroc subs only)
Trump: experience, knowledge of ownship, knowledge of opponent ownship

The way I’ve used this tactic, is, If you want to take a more aggressive tone in the scenario, try and stir up some confusion on the target and ‘maintain’ stealth all in the same time, then fish riding will help you do that by allowing you to close the distance further and faster into the area while in the same time attempting to intimidate your opponent and disrupt his / her focus and attention. The tactic involves a fish set for ‘flank’ speed of the sub followed by enabling of the fish and transiting in a desired direction within its NB signature. Fish riding / wire guided passive spread could be a nasty combo but I haven’t tried this yet.

Once you’ve closed enough distance you disable(active) the fish, rig all stop, listen for the target, attempt to locate him then follow-up with another, possibly final attack. Sometimes if lucky, you will regain contact and locate the target, and if you are close enough to get demon, you pretty much have a solution on a single array at this point.. Then when he is ramping down trying to go back into stealth, wire guide the fish and enable it moments before it reaches the target, or, let him run and beef up your firing solution, then follow up with another salvo of torps or subrocs or in combination.

The confusion comes in when the target is not running and is attempting a NB contact, where it would be a little more challenging(my experience) designating NB contact on the sub (hard NB contact) because of the fish noise. If the target is running at speeds higher than 100% washout – he can’t possibly listen and provides data for the aggressor. For targets who are not so easily intimidated and know when they are really in trouble, they can see right through this tactic. Fish riding is especially handy when trying to transit from shallow to deep in a vs akula scenario, assuming the aklua driver plays into it. More than likely the target will react with a counter-shot on your TIW bearing, but a wire guided torpedo tuned for fish riding allows you to pretty much navigate while masked.